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Abstract 
Democratic conditionality accession clauses have become increasingly common in certain 
international organisations. Similarly, provisions on suspension of membership because of breaches of 
democratic order have emerged. Why do regional organisations introduce these kin of clauses? In 
most cases, they developed after 1989 in a new geopolitical climate in which democratic ideals 
acquired normative hegemony. This does not exclude a purposive rational institutional design. On the 
one hand, accession clauses developed a posteriori of the creation of the organization being applied 
hence to new members rather to the ones creating them. These clauses have been used as an 
instrument for fostering clubness and imposing institutional features of applying states. On the other 
hand, in the case of suspension, institutional design serves to trade-off two competing principles: 
commitment to democratic conditionality and respect for sovereignty of member states and it does so 
by leaving wide discretion in implementing provisions for suspension clauses. 
Keywords 
Institutional design, Comparative regional integration, Democratization 
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Introduction* 
Why do regional organizations contain a democratic clause for membership and/or the suspension of 
rights? The design of international institutions seldom includes a democratic requirement for 
membership and clauses for scrutinising members’ adherence to this principle. In fact, in a data set of 
85+ IOs (Closa et al.; 2013 forthcoming), only a handful of these required their members to be 
democratic and to respect human rights. By and large, these coincide with organizations that define 
themselves as “regional” (i.e. restricting membership to a given regional area) and as “integrational” 
(i.e. defining “integration” –mainly meaning economic integration- as one of their objectives). The 
democratic requirement is often matched with a democratic control clause which allows organizations 
to suspend membership if democratic values or human rights are conculcated (the cases in which there 
is an explicit reference are AU, CAN, ECOWAS, EU, MERCOSUR, OIF, OAS, UNASAUR). Some 
others have a broader clause which allows suspension if states fail to comply with their obligations, 
which has been taken loosely as also covering democracy (i.e. SADC towards Madagascar). 
Organizations with this kind of provision exist in different regions of the world with different national 
traditions, and their convergence on this similarity of design challenges the assumption of institutional 
variance due to the different ideas and identity of actors, as well as history (Johnson and Acharya; 
2007).  
This paper discusses why the institutional design of some regional integration organizations 
contains this specific provision, i.e. the existence of a democratic conditionality clause. This paper 
examines two pieces of institutional design connecting democracy and membership: accession and 
suspension. They pose different challenges for actors: in accession clauses, current members 
hypothetically pass on the “burden of proof” to would-be members, and thus the former may act as 
“club members”, imposing costs on third parties. In suspension clauses, however, any member may be 
affected; they therefore need to take into account in their design the possibility of being affected by the 
clause themselves. Thus the trade-off between limiting sovereignty and institutional efficiency is more 
acute.  
For each of these two pieces of institutional design the paper reviews, firstly, their explicit 
inclusion in the charters of IOs and the moment at which this happens. This allows us to establish 
whether “club behaviour” prevailed. Secondly, it examines the institutional design for implementing 
provisions for conditional membership. In order to control the effects of such provisions, states may 
try to shape their practical implementation. They may try to limit delegation to independent 
implementing agencies, or they may reinforce their decision-making role by means of certain voting 
thresholds that secure their influence, etc. Thirdly, the paper looks at the practical functioning of the 
institution of democratic conditionality. 
1. Democratization and membership of international organizations: The second image 
reversed 
Membership of international oganizations serve to create a credible commitment to democratization 
(Pevehouse; 2002; Mansfield and Pevehouse; 2006). Domestic actors perceive membership as a strong 
guarantee of their commitment to the new regime, and this commitment clearly establishes the 
structure of costs and benefits respectively of sticking to the original commitment or of breaching it. In 
parallel, a significant literature has explored the capacity of IOs to act as promoters of democracy vis-
à-vis third states (Pridham, 1994; 2001; Whitehead; 1993; 1996a; 1996b; Hungtington; 1991) and 
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several cases record successes of IOs as anchors and or promoters of democracy (for instance, 
MERCOSUR; Malamud, 2013:11). 
These analyses take into account not only the “demand” side for credible commitment (the demand 
coming from democratizing states) but also the “supply” side; i.e. the IOs’ offer of these 
commitments. However, in this literature supply does not derive from the specific institutional 
characteristics of the organizations, but from an analytical construction of the organization’s character, 
arising from the characteristics of the regimes of its member states. Thus, Pevehouse (2002: 16) 
correlates democratization with the “democratic density” of IOs, defined as the average level of 
democracy within a regional IO, taking member states as the unit of analysis. From this, he argues that 
the higher the “democratic density” of an IO, the more likely it is that liberalization requirements will 
exist and be enforced.  
In this model the institutional characteristics and, specifically, the institutional conditionality of the 
IOs remain unexplained or unaccounted for. Logically, with membership being conditioned on the 
democratization argument, IOs with high democratic density may be more prone to create some sort of 
explicit and formal democratic condition for the accession of potential members. This choice raises a 
dilemma: on the one hand, conditionality creates a commitment to a model which reduces uncertainty 
about the future behaviour of a state by locking it into specific features consistent with the objectives 
of the organization (and other states). In particular, requiring a country to be democratic in order to 
become a member of an organization diminishes uncertainty about the future configuration of its 
domestic regime; and this may increase the certainty that the regime will honour its international 
commitments. But on the other hand we may assume that states do not wish to restrict their unfettered 
sovereignty by creating supra-state commitments which they cannot control. Setting conditions for 
membership such as respect for democracy and human rights contradicts the principles inherent in 
many organizations that they should respect the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention. 
Three theoretical approaches offer possible responses to the question of why IOs create conditional 
democracy provisions for membership. A realistic position would argue that institutions do not matter, 
and states can quite simply afford to have any kind of provision constraining their domestic behaviour, 
since they can ignore them. If this were the case, we could expect any organization to contain this kind 
of provisions, since they do not matter. And yet they seldom occur, proving intuitively that states are 
not prepared to create this kind of provision, whether efficient or not. An alternative response would 
emphasize the power of ideas and norms, and it would argue that the ideal of democratic government 
has become a globally accepted principle which is broadly endorsed and shared (Franck, 1992; Fox, 
1992; Marks, 2011; McMahon, 2012). Moral principles such as equality, liberty and democracy can be 
said to transcend current political practice; they can be considered as global goods (Coglianese, 2000), 
and even organizations such as OAU, in which sovereignty concerns originally led to scepticism about 
considering these values as “global goods”, have ended up embracing them as a mechanism to foster 
their legitimacy (Lotze et. al. 2012). On the other hand, a number of authors (Acharya, 2001) contest 
the universality of certain norms, adopting similar constructivist positions; democracy, like other 
norms, would be perceived as a specifically Western norm which could not be replicated by other 
organizations such as ASEAN. 
The rational design approach provides a third alternative explanation: states use international 
organizations to further their own goals, and they design institutions accordingly (Koremenos et al; 
2001a: 762). International institutions are the self-conscious creation of states. States construct and 
shape institutions to advance their goals (…); design differences are not random. They are the result of 
rational, deliberate interactions among states and other international actors to solve specific problems. 
And the institutional design responds to a dilemma between efficiency and sovereignty: all things 
being equal, nation-states might be expected to prefer institutional designs that impose the least 
constraint on their sovereign legal authority, but some of the least constraining forms may be 
ineffective (Coglianese, 2000: 298). 
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Applying this rationalistic assumption to conditionality, it could be argued that the existence of a 
democratic requirement may be attributed to rational deliberate interaction among Member States. 
Since conditionality acts as a restrictive device for membership, the stylized conjectures on 
institutional design deduced by Koremenos and associates may apply. They argue, firstly, that 
restrictive membership increases with the severity of the enforcement problem, and the severity of the 
enforcement problem increases with the number of actors (Koremenos et al, 2001a: 783-784). A 
second conjecture argues that restrictive membership increases with uncertainty about preferences. 
Membership enables states to learn about each others’ preferences, and the membership mechanism 
can distinguish cooperative members from non-cooperators. Empirical evidence gathered within the 
rational design project supports only the second conjecture, i.e. restrictive membership increases with 
uncertainty.  
This paper aims to bring together normative and rational design responses, which are in fact not 
contradictory in relation to democratic conditionality: organizations may choose to introduce 
democratic conditionality as a mechanism to enhance their own legitimacy. By doing so, they also 
serve to increase certainty. However, states calculate the effects of the working of the institution (even 
if the calculation is imperfect or plainly wrong). Along with these democratic criteria, states introduce 
into their calculation their wish to limit the delegation of sovereignty as much as possible. The 
institutional design of implementation of conditionality serves this purpose. Timing, scrutiny of 
compliance and decision-making procedures are three mechanisms that amplify the margin of action 
for states in applying conditionality. 
2. The democratic requirement for membership in international organizations 
Admission of new members may be costly, since it may impose costs on existing members and on the 
organization itself. For instance, accession may imply adapting the organs and the representation of 
member states within. Open accession (i.e. with no restriction whatsoever) exists in IOs in which the 
accession of a new member state contributes to furthering the organization’s objectives.1 More 
commonly, IOs condition membership on a decision of their organs and/or states, but it is not 
uncommon for organizations to restrict membership to states belonging to a particular group. In 
general, the nature of requirements for admission can usually be explained by examining the 
objectives of the organization in question (Schermers and Blokker; 2011: 87). 
Organizations usually preserve “clubness”, stipulating certain criteria for membership. When 
membership criteria exist, it is quite common to require that the acceding state should belong to the 
geographical area defining the region, to the point that geography may dictate the exclusion of an 
application (as happened with Morocco’s application for EU membership). Geographical affinity is 
more often expressed in terms of continental position (i.e. African, American, Asian or European), 
although there exist a few cases of intercontinental geographical membership, either because they 
cover an intercontinental border area (e.g. GUAM), they cover a separating ocean/sea (i.e. rim 
organizations such as APEC) or because the basis for membership is cultural or religious identity (for 
instance, being an Arabic or Islamic country). Table 1 below provides a chart of existing democratic 
requirements for membership of IOs. 
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Table 1 Membership requirements 
Requirement International organization 
Structural Geographical area AEC, AU, ACS, ASEAN, CARICOM, COMESA, 
CAN, GCC, CoE, EAC, ECOWAS, ECO, EU, 
IOR.ARC, LAFTA, MERCOSUR, NATO, OAU, 
OAS, BSEC, OECS, OEI, SCO, SICA, UNASUR, 
UEMOA, WAMZ 
Cultural/religious AAEU, Arab League, OIC, OIF, AMU 
Political Democracy and human rights 
(express mention in the treaty or 
protocol) and year of introduction 
AU (2001), CoE (1949), EAC (2000), EU 
(1992), MERCOSUR (1996-1998), GUAM 
(2001), , OAS (1992), UNASUR (2010) 
Commitment to respect the 
objectives and principles 
ASEAN, CARICOM, CIS, ECO, EAEC, IOR-ARC, 
KEDO, NATO, OECD, GUAM, SCO, SICA 
No specific requirement IAEA, ICES, ILO, IMO, IMF, IMSO, ITSO, PICES, 
OPCW, UN, UPU, WIPO, WICO, WHO, 
UNWHO 
Source: Own elaboration. In bold, integration schemes with more than one membership requirement 
Table 1 above summarizes the findings of the analysis of 85 organizations. The data reveal that a 
relatively reduced number of organizations contain explicit provisions requiring would-be applicants 
to be democratic. Only eight referred to this condition. Strictly speaking, only the CoE, EAC, EU and 
GUAM include an explicit requirement to respect democracy. Moreover, only three of these originally 
had democracy as a membership requirement in their charters, while in the other five cases they 
acquired it afterwards. Hence, judging on the basis of explicit treaty requirements, states seem to 
favour sanctioning sovereignty rather than imposing constraints on their own regimes when designing 
membership rules. 
The temporal sequence in the creation of those institutional provisions provides an important 
insight. The CoE introduced the provision into its constitution in the after-war period, while provisions 
in the OAS and NATO Charters implicitly conditioned membership on democracy. The NATO charter 
restricts membership to European states which may contribute to furthering the principles of the 
treaties (democracy, individual liberties and the rule of law); while OAS conditions membership on 
respect for the Charter and acceptance of its obligations, in particular those regarding collective 
security. The OAS amended its charter and introduced a procedure to verify whether conditions for 
admission had been fulfilled in connection with the admissibility of Trinidad and Tobago in 1967. On 
the other hand, the admission of not fully democratic Portugal into NATO (1949), and of several 
dubious Latin American democracies into OAS creates a perception of militant anti-communist 
organizations with a geopolitical role vis-à-vis third parties, rather than being strictly concerned with 
the domestic democratic quality of their partners. 
From 1989 onwards, democratic conditionality clauses mushroomed in several organizations. 
While the EU had pioneered democratic conditionality policy since the 1960s, when the EP rejected a 
Spanish application for associated membership on grounds of non-compliance with human rights and 
democracy, it only created an explicit policy in 1992 with the Copenhagen principles and their 
eventual inclusion in the Treaty of Lisbon. A few other organizations imitated the move over the next 
two decades. Thus in 1996 MERCOSUR members signed the Democratic Commitment with Chile 
and Bolivia, and the members transformed it into the Ushuaia Protocol on Democratic Commitment in 
1998. This requires members to maintain democratic systems and foresees systems for sanctions. 
Similarly, in 2000 the Andean Community approved the Additional Protocol to the Cartagena 
Agreement. Andean Community Commitment to Democracy and UNASUR, while it has no explicit 
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requirement of democracy, in 2010 approved an Additional Protocol on Democratic Commitment akin 
to the MERCOSUR one. The AU adopted the African Charter on Democracy, elections and 
governance and ECOWAS adopted the 2001 Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance which 
contains a long list of the criteria defining democratic good governance to be fulfilled by member 
states. Even though the SADC lacks a specific clause on democratic conditionality for membership, 
this may be inferred from the wording of other provisions. The SADC Treaty recognises “human 
rights, democracy and the rule of law” as principles guiding the acts of its members (art. 4) while 
Article 5 commits the Member States to “promote common political values, systems and other shared 
values which are transmitted through institutions, which are democratic, legitimate and effective”. It 
also commits Member States to “consolidate, defend and maintain democracy, peace, security and 
stability” in the region. The 2001 Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation commits 
SADC Member States to the promotion of democratic institutions and practices as well as to respect 
for human rights, and the Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections (2004) 
reinforced this commitment. Finally, the Commonwealth of Nations added a democratic conditionality 
requirement with the 1997 Edinburgh Declaration. 
In almost all cases, IOs acquired democratic conditionality after their creation. This may provoke 
some inconsistency between the initial design, in which membership was based on strict respect for 
the configuration of states’ domestic regimes, and the new demands of respecting the democratic 
principle. Original members did not have to fulfil conditions for membership, but they created them 
later as a pre-commitment for future applicants. For existing members, the democratic conditionality 
clause made sense as a suspension clause (i.e. a role of oversight granted to the organization over the 
domestic regime, once the state is a member of the organization). 
Democratic conditionality matches geographically restricted membership: organizations restrict 
membership to a given geographical area (e.g. Europe, Africa, America)
2
 as a precondition for 
accession in all cases in which democracy and respect for human rights is also required. GUAM is the 
only exception, being an organization of former Soviet states which covers both European and Asian 
states, although with a distinctly regional character. This establishes a clear pattern, setting aside the 
organizations with this kind of requirement from global (e.g. UN), functional (e.g. IHO) or 
intercontinental (e.g. APEC) organizations, the Commonwealth of Nations being the only exception. 
Thus, democratic conditionality is a regional rather than a global good. 
Combining democratic conditionality with organizational objectives, the following pattern 
emerges: most of the organizations requiring their members to be democratic commit themselves to 
the objective of “integration”. In comparison, no free trade area explicitly requires its members to be 
democratic (although this may be implicit in NAFTA and EFTA). Free trade agreements do not 
necessarily require states to be democratic as a prerequisite for their conclusion. Even though 
democratic states outscore non democratic states in the number of trade agreements concluded, few (if 
any) FTAs contain democratic clauses. One explanation for this may simply be the bilateral character 
of these agreements: there being only two parties, each of them would simultaneously become the 
guardian and guarantor of the other’s democracy. Additionally, a second argument would sustain that 
free trade does not logically demand democracy for its effective functioning and the requirement is 
therefore unnecessary. The hypothesis arising from these facts is that the number and intensity of 
public goods delivered by an organization may make democratic conditionality more appealing not 
only as a normative legitimizing factor, but also as a factor securing certainty in future behaviour. 
A caveat applies: in all cases, treaties contain nuances of the democratic requirements, with explicit 
recognition of the principles of sovereignty, territorial integrity, non-intervention, etc. Furthermore, 
three cases (AU, OAS, and UNASUR) set these principles as the objectives of the organization itself. 
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members. In 1997, and following the inclusion of Communist Vietnam, Myanmar joined, despite the country’s economic 
and political isolation by the West.
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The African Union exemplifies this radical contradiction between its competing objectives: while the 
Constitutive Act prohibits member states from interfering in each other’s affairs, the Union is vested 
with full rights of intervention on behalf of member states, once authorized by the Assembly of Heads 
of State and Government. The preservation of political stability constitutes a legitimate reason for 
intervention. It is also true that the AU has gone further, most notably in its legislative framework, 
than any other regional or sub-regional body in articulating the link between human rights and 
security, and in asserting the role of the regional community in protecting its citizens from gross 
violations of human rights (Loetz et al; 2012). All things considered, it seems that preserving the 
sovereignty of member states carries more weight than democratic conditionality in designing 
membership characteristics. 
2.1. Institutional rules for implementing democratic conditionality membership: scrutiny and 
decision 
Introducing democratic conditionality may boost the legitimacy of IOs. On the other hand, states want 
to preserve their own sovereignty as far as possible. Drafters of institutions thus face the dilemma of 
balancing these two competing principles. If drafters really do want to constrain states, then they will 
choose designs that minimize the twin problems of time inconsistency and political uncertainty. 
Increasing delegation with decreasing principal control acts in this direction. If drafters choose to 
prioritize sovereignty, they may choose more flexible implementation instruments. Hence, the 
institutional design of the implementation of democratic conditionality reveals how drafters settle the 
dilemma between sovereignty and certainty. 
The two central features are the scrutiny of compliance of applicant states and the decision-making 
procedure for accepting new members. 
Scrutiny of compliance. Scrutinising whether an applicant state complies with the conditions for 
membership may be entrusted to an independent agency or to an intergovernmental body. The choice 
is highly relevant since, prima facie, handling scrutiny to a third party increases the credibility of both 
the organization and the democratic credentials of the acceding state which obtains clearance.  
 Independent agencies. This model prevails in European organizations. In 1951 the CoE 
formalized a procedure
3
 which called for consultation with the Consultative Assembly 
(afterwards, PACE). The Assembly’s political pluralism limited the ability of national 
governments to manoeuvre freely, bypassing democratic conditionality. Since 1992 the Venice 
Commission, an advisory body to the Parliamentary Assembly (PACE), has scrutinized the 
conformity of the legislation of applicant states to the standards of human rights, rule of law and 
respect for human rights of the CoE. While PACE votes on the basis of those non-binding 
reports, the final decision still remains in the hands of the Council of Ministers. In the EU, the 
Commission scrutinizes the fulfilment of criteria, evaluating progress and setting benchmarks.  
 Intergovernmental bodies. Most organizations remain silent on the existence of a scrutiny body. 
In some cases, organizations have in practice constructed intergovernmental bodies, such as the 
EAC Verification Commission, following the applications of three states. But ad hoc 
intergovernmental procedures are the most common practice.  
Decision-making. Virtually no organization applies conditionality mechanically, whereby a positive 
review of progress will automatically lead to accession. In all cases, member states reserve the right to 
vote on accession. In most cases, accession is decided by unanimity or consensus (in fact, majority for 
accession of new members is a rather exceptional provision which exists in the WHO (art. 6) and AU 
(art. 29.2)). An exception to this rule is the OAS, where accession decisions require the affirmative 
vote of two thirds of the Member States. 
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2.2. Practice of democratic conditionality 
Admission practices do not necessarily conform to the formal conditions established. For instance, in 
relation to the UN, Schermers and Blokker (2011: 83) note that since the second half of the 1950s 
conditions (i.e. being “peace loving states”) have played a diminishing role in evaluating membership, 
and they have been invoked only incidentally by individual members, to the point that UN practice has 
evolved from conditional to unconditional universality. In general, the costs of implementing 
conditionality provisions may explain the divergence between the norm and its implementation: 
“costs” refer to the political cost of delegating powers to implementing organs, but also literally to the 
material cost that implementation may incur. Naturally, this applies to democratic conditionality. 
Table 2. Democratic conditionality provisions on accession to IOs 
Organization Original 
membership 
Conditionality 
provision/year 
Acceded 
members 
(feb. 
2013) 
Denied 
membership 
African Union (formerly 
OAU) 
31 Y (Ac)/2001 23  
CAN 4 Y (Ac)/2000 1 0 
CARICOM 4 N 11 0 
Council of Europe 10 Y (1949) 37 2 (Belarus, 
Kazakhstan) 
Commonwealth of 
Nations 
7 Y (ac)/1997 47 0 
EAC 5 Y 0 1 (Sudan) 
ECOWAS 15 Y (Ac)/2001 0 0 
EU 6 Y 22 1 (Morocco) 
MERCOSUR 4 Y (Ac)/1996-8 1 0 
NATO 12 Y (ac)/1992 16 0 
GUAM 5 Y 0 0 
OAS 21 Y 14 0 
OIF 21 Y (Ac)/2000 36 0 
SADC 10 Y (ac)/2001 5 0 
SICA 6 N 1 0 
UNASUR 12 Y (Ac)/2010 0 0 
* Chile withdrew unilaterally on 30 October 1970 because of disagreement with CAN Decision 
No. 24 on the treatment of foreign capital which had a marked protectionist character. Ac 
(Acquired) 
More specifically, the practice of democratic conditionality for membership presents a weak picture. 
In general, membership has remained fairly stable, with European organizations heading growth: the 
CoE (37 new members since its foundation); EU (22) and NATO (16). Outside Europe, the AU 
acquired 23 new members, the OAS 14 and MERCOSUR (1). Rejections are very infrequent: just 
three cases in the CoE, and one (so far, with two others pending) in the EAC. The institutional design 
of democratic conditionality has thus operated in an environment characterized largely by a stable 
membership of IOs which pre-dated the introduction of these provisions. 
Practice shows that European organizations had the highest record in terms of increasing 
membership. As for the Council of Europe, only two cases (Belarus and Kazakhstan) had their 
applications rejected for not fulfilling democratic/human rights criteria; in the case of Belarus, its 
application has been frozen since 1997. Additionally, in 1995 the CoE suspended the procedure for 
Russian accession because of Russian actions in Chechnya. The Council of Europe resumed the 
procedure shortly afterwards, and Russia became a member in 1996. The CoE treated the Croatian 
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application similarly: in April 1996, PACE had adopted a decision in favour of Croatian membership, 
but President Tudjman’s policies in conflict with Council of Europe principles put Croatia’s accession 
on hold. In November 1996, Croatia became a member. Reflecting on the functioning of democratic 
conditionality of the CoE, the then-Secretary General of the Council, Daniel Tarchys, underlined the 
potential for transformation of these provisions. He suggested that although Central and Eastern 
European states did not have spotless records of democracy when admitted to the Council, the 
commitments accompanying Council membership would expand and solidify democracy in those 
states (Tarschys; 1995) . 
The practice of the EU mirrors that of the Council of Europe, not least because membership of the 
latter also acts as a clearing house for acceding to the former. The EU has not rejected any applicant 
state so far on grounds of a lack of democratic credentials.
4 
Far from being an indicator of a lax policy, 
several examples prove that applicant states have obeyed the strict conditionality policy on democracy 
that the EU enforces. For instance, in the 1990s, the EU “strictly enforced” the conditions of its 
Association Agreement with Slovakia, as a result of President Vladimir Mečiar’s mistreatment of the 
Hungarian minority. The EU also formally removed Slovakia from its first list of applicant countries. 
As for the other organization with a significant increase of membership, the AU, all new members 
except for Sudan (2011) acceded before the transformation of the former OAU into the AU and thus 
before the introduction of democratic conditionality. Given the internal heterogeneity of the AU and 
the majority decision on membership, no great expectations may be placed on democratic 
conditionality. 
Within MERCOSUR, the case of Venezuela proves to some extent the value of democratic 
conditionality, but also its limitations. After abandoning CAN, Venezuela applied for admission to 
MERCOSUR. Although the member states agreed on it in 2006, the Senate of Paraguay blocked 
accession. While the government of Fernando Lugo and the Congress supported accession, the Partido 
Colorado, who controlled the Senate, consistently rejected the ratification of the accession treaty, 
arguing that Venezuela is not a fully democratic state. Senators referred to the democratic imperative 
included in MERCOSUR’s Democratic Commitment and the Ushuaia Protocol. Venezuelan 
membership became possible during the suspension of Paraguay (decided by the Presidents of 
Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay), which in effect rendered unnecessary the Paraguayan Senate’s 
ratification of the accession Protocol. 
The EAC is the only other organization (and the only African one) which has scrutinized 
membership applications in terms of democratic conditionality. The Republic of Sudan saw its 
application declined because Tanzania and Uganda objected to its mistreatment and discrimination of 
black Africans; and other human rights violations, religious intolerance, blatant racism and 
warmongering.
5 
South Sudan and Somalia also applied, and the EAC created a verification committee 
(made of one representative of each state plus three independent members) which issued a Report on 
fulfilment of the criteria for admissibility. The Report advised that the application should be put on 
hold pending key institutional reforms in South Sudan. 
2.3. The effects of the conditionality clause 
Paul Pierson (2000) warned about the functionalist approach, whereby the effects of institutions 
explain the reason for the creation of those institutions. He refers to several factors that may alter this 
                                                     
4
 Morocco is the only case of rejection, but the reason was geographical: it was considered not to be a European state. In its 
negotiations Turkey, on the other hand, faces constant criticism for its democratic and human rights record. However, a 
formal rejection has not happened so far, and Turkey is subject to strict enforcement of EU conditionality. 
5
 EAC split on Khartoum’s bid to join community, serious opposition from Tanzania and Uganda 
http://www.jamiiforums.com/jukwaa-la-siasa/174141-eac-split-on-khartoum%92s-bid-to-join-community-serious-
opposition-from-tanzania-and-uganda.html 
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functionalist assumption: actors may not act strategically, calculations may only consider the short-
term horizon, and there may be unintended effects of institutional design. Despite those criticisms, the 
data show some interesting relationships between cause and effect. Table X below summarizes the 
findings. 
Figure 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The figure indicates the change in the democratic quality of countries acceding to IOs with formal 
accession clauses, using a four point measure: democracy index at accession, democracy index after 5 
years, democracy index after 10 years, and democracy index after 20 years. The results show some 
interesting insights. Firstly, states acceding to organizations that have rigorously applied a democratic 
conditionality clause (e.g. EU. CoE and OAS after 1967) have improved their democratic index from 
period to period. NATO only applied strict democratic conditionality after 1992, and data are not 
available for 20-year membership for East European countries. These countries provide the clearest 
case of democratic improvement for the organization but, in the absence of the 20-year data, the graph 
records NATO’s inability to deal with authoritarian involution in Greece and Turkey after their 
accession in 1952. AU membership has grown, but prior to the introduction of democratic 
conditionality, which may apply in future to new applicants. The graph reflects the declining 
democratic quality of acceding states. The table also includes data for the Commonwealth of Nations, 
which added the clause in 1997; but it only started to apply it after 1997 (effectively, only to one 
member, i.e. Rwanda). The table also refers to the OIF which, although it does not have a democratic 
membership clause, has seen a substantive additional growth in membership, together with an active 
democratic conditionality suspension policy. For the two of these, results show that in general new 
members have had a decreasing democratic quality. 
3. Enforcing the democratic requirement: suspension of membership (institutions and 
instruments) 
Why do states create the commitment to respect democracy as a mechanism for regulating 
membership rights? These kinds of provision raise a key problem of institutional design (Koremenos 
et al; 2001a): enforcement. While conditional membership provisions scrutinize the democratic 
credentials of states at the moment of accession (and provide information on state’s future behaviour,) 
they cannot, on the other hand, control deviation from the original fulfilment of conditions. IOs and 
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member states may therefore face an additional dilemma: how can they ensure that a current member 
honours the original conditions of membership? In order to resolve this dilemma, IOs may create 
enforcement mechanisms which, in relation to membership, have two specific forms
6:
 expulsion and 
suspension. 
Expulsion is a decisive act which terminates membership, while suspension will last until the 
circumstances that provoke it change (Schermers and Blokker; 2011: 111-114); and it may be very 
costly, since it may harm the organization as much as it harms the offending member. Expulsion is 
very uncommon both in terms of constitutional provisions and practice. In relation to formal legal 
provisions, only a limited number of IO constitutions mentioned the possibility of expulsion,
7 
and as 
far as practice is concerned, prior to 1987, only four cases of expulsion of UN agencies took place: 
Czechoslovakia was expelled from the IMF and the World Bank; and South Africa from UP and ITU. 
The number of cases may grow if withdrawal is also considered, since the boundary between 
expulsion and withdrawal is a tenuous one (for instance, Greece withdrew from the Council of Europe 
in 1970 following the Colonels’ coup, but this was a result of the suspension procedure initiated within 
the Council). Koremenos et al. (2001b: 1056) concluded that the scarce use of expulsion renders 
enforcement through membership largely irrelevant, since deviations are apparently rarely punished in 
this way. 
Suspension offers an attractive alternative: offending states may be coerced into adapting their 
behaviour to the conditions set by the organization that they have violated. But suspension also 
presents an enforcement dilemma: on the one hand, states do not wish to restrict their unfettered 
sovereignty by creating supra-state commitments which they cannot control. Additionally, suspension 
clauses do not externalize costs: they potentially affect current members who may have to bear the 
costs, rather than externalising them to third parties. Moreover, cost-bearers may be undefined, since 
no state can calculate a priori to whom it may apply (as proved in the case of the triggering of 
diplomatic sanctions against Austria in the EU). 
While these arguments provide states with powerful reasons to resist such clauses, other arguments 
support them: a suspension clause guarantees an efficient enforcement mechanism for the initial 
democratic requirement and, in this way, suspension clauses also contribute to reducing uncertainty 
about the future behaviour of a state by locking it into specific features consistent with the objectives 
of the organization (and other states). Suspension clauses increase the costs for a given state if it 
defects from its initial commitment. Reneging on conditions set out by an IO can be costly for 
democratic states, serving thus as a deterrent to influential groups within government that may have 
reason to derail liberal reforms; it thus increases the credibility of commitments to sustain such 
programs (Mansfield and Pevehouse; 2006: 143). In summary, suspension may be presented as a 
mechanism for enforcing conditional membership over time. We could call this the “consistency 
expectation”. 
In accordance with the foregoing argument, expulsion may not be a common provision given its 
costs; but when it happens, it may be closely associated to IOs which contain some form of conditional 
membership provision. The data set of 85 IOs shows that Treaties do not usually contain provisions on 
suspension, and the safest conclusion is that suspension is excluded. When suspension provisions do 
exist, they refer most commonly to failure to comply with financial obligations (e.g. paying dues).  
As the “expectation of consistency” anticipates, (i.e. conditional membership correlates with 
suspension because of breach of membership conditions), most IOs with democratic conditional 
                                                     
6
 Of course, IOs may adopt other kin of sanctions. 
7 
UN Charter (art. 6); IMF (Art. XXVI section 2 plus Section 22 By Laws); World Bank (article VI Section 2 plus section 
21 By laws); IFC (Art. V section 2(a) plus art. 18 By Laws); IDA (article VII Section 2(a); Council of Europe (Article 8); 
League of Arab States (art. 18); Asia-Pacific Space Cooperation Organization (article 32); Shangai Cooperation 
Organization (art. 13) 
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membership also have a suspension clause. This is the case of AU, CAN, ECOWAS, EU, 
MERCOSUR, OAS and UNASUR; although a number of organizations contain clauses that permit the 
suspension of membership, as a consequence of non-fulfilment of “general obligations” (which may 
leave a wide margin for interpretation). In cases such as the Council of Europe, this could be 
interpreted as consistent with democratic conditionality for membership, although it is dubious in 
other cases. 
Several organizations have acquired a posteriori a provision for suspending membership because 
of the violation of democratic credentials. In fact, most of the instruments quoted in Section 2 above 
(democratic conditioned membership) function for possible membership suspension. This evolution 
also took place mainly in the 1990s and 2000s, and it reflects the increasing legitimizing value of the 
IOs’ guardianship of democracy for transitional and or weakly democratic states. But these provisions 
also function simultaneously as mechanisms for increasing certainty about the future behaviour of 
these states.  
The clearest (and most radical) case of evolution is that of the African Union in which, 
increasingly, consensus grew on the need to revise the original OAU concepts of sovereignty and non-
interference in line with the view of sovereignty as responsibility (Loetze et al. 2012: 5). Diffusion 
acted as a powerful trigger for the inclusion of suspension provisions: according to some sources,
8
 the 
AU “copied and pasted” the OAS provision which Art. 9 of the Washington Protocol had included in 
1992. 
Table 3 Typology of suspension clauses 
Suspension as a 
consequence of non-
fulfilment of general 
obligations 
Suspension as a 
consequence of non-
fulfilment of financial 
obligations 
Suspension as a 
consequence of offences 
against human 
rights/rule of 
law/democracy  
No specific 
provision on 
suspension 
AEC, COMESA, 
CIS, CoE, EAC, 
ECOWAS, EAEC, EU, 
IAEA, IMF, IOM, 
OPCW, GUAM, 
SADC, SCO, UN, 
UNWTO  
AEC, AU, 
COMESA, CAN, CoE, 
ECCAS, IGAD, IAEA, 
IHO, ILO, IMO, IOM, 
INTERPOL, PICES, 
OPCW, OIC, SADC, 
UN, UPU, WIPO, 
WHO, UNWTO  
AU, CAN, 
ECOWAS, EU, 
MERCOSUR, OIF, 
OAS, UNSAUR  
 
AAEU, ACS, Arab 
League, ASEAN, 
Benelux, CARICOM, 
GCC, ECO, EFTA, 
EPO, Helsinki 
Convention, IOR-
ARC, ICES, IMSO, 
KEDO, LAIA, 
NAFTA, NATO, 
OECD, ODECA, 
OECS, OEI, OPEC, 
SICA, SAFTA, 
SAARC, SEATO, 
UMA, WAEMU, 
WAMZ, WCO, WEU, 
WTO 
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 According to McMahon; 2012 at fn 12, Malian President Alpha Oumar Konare, at the time also President of the 
Organization of African Unity, attended the "Emerging Democracies Forum" in Sana'a, Yemen in June of 1999. He there 
learned about the OAS provision on suspending governments which came to power through undemocratic means. He 
then asked his embassy in Washington D.C. to procure the exact language of the document from the OAS headquarters, 
from which he then drew in proposing the relevant OAU language. 
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3.1. Institutional rules for implementing suspension clauses 
Implementation of suspension clauses may follow a scrutiny system or an incidental one. The former 
depends on periodic scrutiny of domestic compliance with conditionality requirements, while the 
second is triggered ad hoc when specific events seem to threaten democracy in a member state.  
 Permanent scrutiny systems. The Council of Europe issues public reports on member states’ 
compliance with democracy requirements. The only practical case of suspension happened 
before the CoE initiated its reports and it involved the Parliamentary Assembly, the European 
Commission for Human Rights and the Committee of Ministers.  
Similarly, the OIF Declaration of Bamako (2000) introduced a permanent review of democratic 
practices and respect for human rights which could activate the suspension mechanism. The 
General Secretary convenes the Council of Ministers of the Francophonie. The Presidential 
Council may decide, firstly, a number of reputational sanctions (such as condemnation) and, 
afterwards, it may agree on suspension, which is almost automatic if there is a coup d’état 
against a democratically elected government. 
 Incidental systems. Commonly, IOs lack a precise procedure for compliance with conditionality 
leading to an eventual suspension because of its breach. They react on the spot in the case of 
serious breaches of democratic conditionality. At most, they identify a body, most commonly 
intergovernmental, in charge of taking the decision. In the AU, the Peace and Security Council 
(PSC) has decision-making power regarding issues concerning breaches of democratic 
conditionality. The Commonwealth of Nations has a similarly appointed body, the 
Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group (CMAG), which meets regularly to address potential 
breaches of the Harare Declaration. Suspended members are not represented at meetings of 
Commonwealth leaders and ministers, although they remain members of the organization. The 
common characteristic is that the final decision is taken at the highest level, more so in the 
absence of any intermediate procedural step (as is the case of ECOWAS, where suspension 
decisions have been adopted following extraordinary meetings). 
3.2. Practice of suspension because of democratic breaches 
The practice of suspension provides additional insights into institutional design. Practice of 
suspending membership has been traditionally restricted to cases of non-fulfilment of financial 
obligations.
9
 However, practice of suspension of membership because of breach of democratic 
commitments has increased significantly in the last two decades and it extends even to regional 
schemes lacking a specific provision on the issue (SADC in relation to Madagascar in 2009 or SICA 
in relation to Honduras). Even the Arab League, normally oriented towards sovereignty and non-
intervention, applied the suspension of membership in relation to Libya and Siria, both in 2011.
10
 
Cases of suspension of membership (36) in relation to breaches of democratic principles are 
concentrated in continental (e.g. AU, CoE and OAS) and identity-framing organizations (e.g. OIF and 
the Commonwealth). Significantly, most of the cases of suspension are concentrated in African 
organizations and/or African states, particularly after the 2000s. Some countries accumulate more than 
one suspension, and/or suspension from more than one organization.  
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 The WHO has suspended the voting rights of eight members and is considering a further nine, while the IAEA has 
suspended fourteen others. In the past, the UN deprived Haiti (1963) and the Dominican Republic (1968) of voting rights, 
but in 2012 it accepted the voting rights of six member countries in arrears. 
10
 In 1979, the Arab League also suspended Egypt’s membership as a sanction for signing a peace agreement with Israel. 
However, the constitution of the Arab League only provides for expulsion, not suspension. In 1989, the League re-
admitted Egypt. 
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Table 4 Suspension of membership in IOs because of democratic conditionality 
Organization Suspension 
clause 
Suspended members 
African Union 
(formerly OAU) 
Y 10 Togo (2001); CAR (2003); Mauritania (2005, 2008), 
Madagascar (2009), Guinea (2009); Mali (2009; 2012)), Niger 
(2010) 
Ivory Coast (2010), Guinea Bissau (2012) 
CAN Y 0* 
CARICOM N 1 Haiti (2004) 
Council of Europe Y (implicit) 1 Greece (1969) 
Commonwealth of 
Nations 
Y (implicit) 7 Fiji (1987-1997**; 2000 and2006); Nigeria (1995); Pakistan 
(1999; 2007); Zimbabwe (2002)**  
EAC Y (implicit) - 
ECOWAS Y 6 Togo (2001); Guinea (2009); Mali (2009 and 2012); Niger 
(2009); Ivory Coast (2010)  
EU Y - 
MERCOSUR Y 2 Paraguay (1996; 2012) 
NATO N - 
GUAM y - 
OAS Y 2 Cuba (1962); Honduras (2009) 
OIF Y 4 Mauritania (2008); Madagascar (2009); Guinea Bissau 
(2012); Mali (2012) 
SADC Y (implicit) 1 Madagascar (2009) 
SICA N 1 Honduras (2009) 
UNASUR Y 1 Paraguay (2012) 
* Chile withdrew unilaterally on 30 October 1970 because of disagreement with CAN Decision No. 24 on 
the treatment of foreign capital which had a marked protectionist character. 
** Fiji withdrew from the Commonwealth of Nations between 1987 and 1997, and Zimbabwe in 2003. 
The Council of Europe suspended Greece in 1970 after a number of Recommendations and Decisions 
from the Parliamentary Assembly,
11
 and two Reports on the legality of the suspension of constitutional 
order and torture from the European Commission of Human Rights. NATO, whose covenant does not 
contain a suspension clause, took a restrained attitude. The EU, in turn, has not applied its suspension 
clause even once, despite diplomatic skirmishes over Austria (1999) and reports on Hungary, Rumania 
and Bulgaria. In fact, some authors have called for a more militant EU approach to the defence of 
democracy in its member states. 
African cases show an unclear overlap between suspension in continental and regional 
communities. Each of them has their own protocols with detailed provisions on how to act in the event 
of human rights violations or unconstitutional changes of government. In practice, the regional and 
continental levels often work in parallel. However, discrepancies between the normative standards 
embedded in the AU and the regional organizations complicate this. Thus, the African Union has 
suspended members because of breaches of democratic conditions in 10 cases between 2001 and 2012 
and this has activated similar measures in African regional integration schemes: SADC (Madagascar, 
2009); ECOWAS (Togo, 2001, Ivory Coast, 2010; and Mali, 2009) and OIF (Mauritania, 2008; 
Madagascar; 2009 and Guinea, 2009). ECOWAS has unilaterally suspended membership for three 
countries: Guinea-Bissau (2008), Niger (2009) and Ivory Coast (2009) following either coups d’état or 
fraudulent elections. 
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 PACE Decisions 346 (1967) and 385 (1968) and PACE Recommendations 547 (1969) and 569 (1969). 
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The Ivory Coast case illustrates the overlapping yet different approaches to suspension. While the 
AU initiated proceedings for suspension, ECOWAS moved much more quickly and suspended the 
Ivory Coast from all decision-making in the organization until a transfer of power had occurred. As 
the crisis continued, the positions of the AU, ECOWAS and UN increasingly diverged. While the AU 
adopted a more possibilistic position, seeking to find a political solution to the conflict, ECOWAS and 
the UN quickly came to set human rights concerns above the need to find a political solution to the 
stalemate, thus adopting a more strongly interventionist approach to bring about an end to the conflict. 
The practice of suspension of American organizations shows a similar pattern of divergence 
between continental and regional organizations. In 1962, the OAS decided on the exclusion of Cuba 
from participation in the Inter-American System, arguing that “the present Government of Cuba, 
which has officially identified itself as a Marxist-Leninist government, is incompatible with the 
principles and objectives of the inter-American system”.12 Six states abstained in the vote, since they 
questioned the authority of the OAS to take the decision in the absence of an explicit Charter 
provision. The OAS, though, seems to have taken the view that states which no longer satisfy the 
criteria may be suspended even in the absence of express Charter provision (Schermers and Blokker; 
2011: 117). Cuban suspension terminated on June 3, 2009 after a vote by the foreign ministers of OAS 
member countries.
13
 The only other case of suspension happened in 2009, when the OAS suspended 
Honduras following a coup d’état. 
American regional organizations have developed the practice of suspending membership 
independently of the umbrella of the OAS. MERCOSUR initiated this path in 1996 when it pressured 
against a military plot in Paraguay. Observers have noted the importance of MERCOSUR in enforcing 
its democracy condition: "But for MERCOSUR, Paraguay would this year almost certainly have gone 
back to military rule, setting a dangerous precedent for Latin America" (Economist 1996, S4; see also 
Dominguez 1998). Paraguay´s case illustrates how practice, in fact, inspired the norm since 
MERCOSUR member states concluded the Commitment to Democracy a few months after the 
attempted coup and the Ushuaia Protocol two years later. In 2012, MERCOSUR members appealed to 
the Protocol to deal with the decision of the Senate of Paraguay to oust President Lugo. MERCOSUR 
governments saw the decision as unlawful and undermining the country’s constitutional order; and in 
response governments activated the provision that allowed the suspension of the offending state from 
attendance at block meetings. UNASUR, which had a similar clause although with greater scope,
14
 
adopted the same measures as MERCOSUR. 
Organizations have also developed a practice of suspension without a specific treaty provision. 
CARICOM suspended Haiti in 2004 after the ousting of President Aristide. Suspension did not follow 
any procedure, and arose from personal contacts between CARICOM leaders. SICA also suspended 
Honduras in 2009 despite lacking a specific suspension provision. 
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 Resolution VI: Exclusion of the Present Government of Cuba from Participation in the Inter-American System, Eighth 
Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Punta del Este, January 1962. See 
http://www.cidh.oas.org/countryrep/Cuba79eng/intro.htm  
13
 AG/RES. 2438 (XXXIX-O/09) 
14
 Decisión No.26/2012, Reunión Extraordinaria del Consejo de Jefas y Jefes de Estado y de Gobierno de UNASUR. In 
fact, Paraguay had not ratified the Protocolo Adicional sobre Compromiso con la Democracia and furthermore some of 
its parliamentarians had denounced it: “Parlamentarios de Paraguay cuestionan cláusula democrática de la UNASUR”. 
Comunicado de prensa de la Delegación de Paraguay del Parlamento del MERCOSUR. 
http://www.parlamentodelmercosur.org/innovaportal/v/5656/1/secretaria/parlamentarios_de_paraguay_cuestionan_clausu
la_democratica_de_la_unasur.html 
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3.3. Effects of suspension 
Several practical difficulties limit an accurate appreciation of the effects of democratic conditionality 
suspension provisions. Firstly, the absolute number of cases is not large (N=36); and secondly they 
contain a certain circularity, since the same state may be suspended simultaneously by more than one 
organization. Thirdly, several of the cases are relatively recent and either suspension has not been 
lifted and/or there are no updated measurements in the Polity data set. This reduces the whole universe 
of available cases to 16. 
With due caution, the following figure shows a positive relation between the duration of suspension 
and the improvement of the democratic quality of a state; and the strength of the relationship improves 
if the two outlier cases (i.e. Pakistan and Fiji) are removed. 
Figure 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4. Concluding remarks 
Democratic conditionality accession (and suspension) provisions are, with the exceptions of the CoE 
and OAS, norms acquired by IOs after 1989. This was, in most cases, long after their creation, at a 
moment when geopolitical changes gave democratic ideals significant normative hegemony. Temporal 
introduction of democratic conditionality for accession meant that current members were not affected 
and could transfer the cost of conditionality to would-be members. However, the parallel development 
of democratic conditionality suspension clauses could potentially affect any of the members. 
Organizations trade off conditionality and sovereignty by means of implementing designs leaving a 
margin for interpretation by states of potential breaches.  
Practice shows different patterns between accession and suspension: the three most demanding 
organizations in the implementation of accession (i.e. CoE, EU and OAS) are not the most active in 
the implementation of suspension. On the contrary, democratic conditionality suspension seems to be 
associated quantitatively with organizations (e.g. AU, Commonwealth of Nations and OIF) which did 
not apply democratic conditionality membership requirements.  
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Although this paper does not maintain a strictly functionalist interpretation (i.e. the function 
performed by an institution explains its origin), the effects of both provisions lend support to the 
rational design approach: on the one hand, organizations that have applied democratic conditionality 
for accession have seen how acceding members have improved their democratic quality; while those 
organizations which did not apply the provision (mainly because membership remained stable) have 
seen declining democratic quality in acceding members. As for suspension, there are difficulties in 
measuring effects, but impressionistic data on the effects of suspension and its duration show a 
tendency towards the improvement of democracy in suspended members.  
Data 
I have used the Polity IV Project Data set which contains data on 186 countries with populations 
greater than 500,000. Regimes are marked yearly using concomitant qualities of democratic and 
autocratic authority in governing institutions, rather than discrete and mutually exclusive forms of 
governance. The “Polity Score” captures the regime authority spectrum on a 21-point scale ranging 
from -10 (hereditary monarchy) to +10 (consolidated democracy). The Polity scores can also be 
converted to regime categories: authors recommend a three-part categorization of “autocracies” (-10 to 
-6), “anocracies” (-5 to +5 and the three special values: -66, -77, and -88), and “democracies” (+6 to 
+10); see "Global Regimes by Type, 1946-2006" above. The Polity scheme consists of six component 
measures that record key qualities of executive recruitment, constraints on executive authority, and 
political competition. It also records changes in the institutionalized qualities of governing authority. 
The Polity data include information only on the institutions of the central government and on political 
groups acting, or reacting, within the scope of that authority. It does not include consideration of 
groups and territories that are actively removed from that authority (i.e., separatists or “fragments”; 
these are considered separate, though not independent, polities) or segments of the population that are 
not yet effectively politicized in relation to central state politics. 
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